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COURT OF APPEALS, 1961 TERM

with the instant case, means that if the mortgagee voluntarily pays subsequent
local taxes, the federal government's lien will take preference over such
payments, but if the mortgagee orders foreclosure, local taxes will be paid
just as expenses thereby protecting the interest of the mortgagee, although the
purpose of the Civil Practice Act Section 1087 is to protect the purchaser at
the foreclosure sale. 25 A consideration of the above leads to the conclusion that
the controlling authorities support the view of the dissenting judges and that
the Supreme Court will adopt their conclusion in reversing the instant case. 26
R.W.S.
NOTICE BY PUBLICATION-POSTING SUFFICIENT IN CONDEMNATION PROCEEDING

In 1952, the City of New York, pursuant to the Water Supply Act,1
acquired the right to divert the Neversink River. In accordance with the notice
provisions of the Act, defendant published notice of the diversion in two
newspapers located in the county in which the affected real estate was situated
for the statutory period and posted handbills in the vicinity of the affected
land. In 1959, after the three-year limitation in which claims might be filed
expired, plaintiff, a riparian owner of a parcel situated twenty-five miles downstream from the diversion, brought an action to enjoin the diversion on the
ground that not until 1959 did plaintiff actually learn of the proceedings.
Plaintiff asserted a right to file a claim, based on her property damage and
lack of notice and challenged the notice provisions as constitutionally inadequate in failing to satisfy due process requirements.2 Plaintiff appealed from
an Appellate Division judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground it
was barred by the expiration of the statutory period.3 Held, affirmed with two
judges dissenting. Constructive notice provided for by the Water Supply Act
satisfied the demands of due process in that it reasonably apprised the interested parties of the pendency of the action and afforded complainant an
opportunity to file her claim. Personal service was not necessary in this type
of case. Schroeder v. City of New York, 10 N.Y.2d 522, 180 N.E.2d 568, 225
N.Y.S.2d 210 (1962).
The type of notice which would satisfy the constitutional requirement of
due process is not translatable into a neat, self-defining judicial formula. This
was well stated by the Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
& Loan Assoc. v. Lewis, 14 A-D.2d 150, 218 N.Y.S.2d 857 (2d Dep't 1961); Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 9 A.D.2d 356, 194 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1st Dep't 1959).
25. Wesselman v. The Engel Co., 309 N.Y. 27, 127 N.E.2d 736 (1955).
26. Cert. granted, sub nom. United States v. Buffalo Savings Bank, supra note 1.
1. Administrative Code of City of New York, ch. 41, tit. K.

2. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 "Nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without the due process of law .... "; N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6. "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
3. 14 A.D.2d 183, 217 N.Y.S.2d 975 (3d Dep't 1961).
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Trust Co.,4 and Walker v. City of Hutchinson:5 notice required will vary with
circumstances and conditions, but it must be reasonably calculated to inform
the parties of proceedings which may directly and adversely affect their
interests. The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity
to be heard.6 This right to be heard has little value unless one is informed
can choose for himself whether to appear or
that the matter is pending and
7
default, acquiesce or contest.
The much discussed Mullane8 case arose when the Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co., in compliance with the applicable statute, published notices of
judicial hearings concerning the settlement of accounts of the trustee of a
common trust fund. The notices appeared once a week for four successive
weeks in a newspaper designated by the court. None of the interested parties
were named in the publications despite the fact that their names and addresses
were known. Mullane, the attorney who represented the interests of the beneficiaries in the income of the common trust fund, objected that the notice so
given was inadequate to afford due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The resulting doctrine of the Mullane case is that publication affords sufficient
notice where the names and addresses of interested persons are unknown but
does not afford notice compatible with the requirements of due process when
the names and addresses of interested persons are known or could be ascertained with reasonable diligence. In the Walker case,9 the Supreme Court struck
down a Kansas statute which required either constructive notice or personal
notice to fix compensation in a condemnation proceeding where the notice
actually given was by publication. The Court said: "It is common knowledge
that mere newspaper publication rarely informs a landowner of proceedings
against his property. . . . Even a letter would have apprised him that his
property was about to be taken and that he must appear if he wanted to be
heard as to its value."' 0
The question of the adequacy of notice by publication was before the
11
Supreme Court again in City of N.Y. v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R.R. In this decision
the court held that notice under provisions of the Bankruptcy Act was inadequate because the name and address of an interested party were known. This
decision indicated that the Mullane doctrine could be applied in situations other
than those involving common trust funds. Such a broad application has been
3
made or discussed by some courts in cases of divorce 1 2 foreign corporations,"
4. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
5.

352 U.S. 112 (1956).

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914).
Milhiken v. Meyer, 311 US. 457 (1940).
Supra note 4.
Supra note 5.
Supra note 5, at 116.
344 U.S. 293 (1953).
See, e.g., McLean v. McLean, 233 N.C. 139, 63 S.E.2d 138 (1951).
See, e.g., Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
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and class actions. 14 Other courts, however, including those in New York, have
taken a narrow view of the rule in the Mullane case and have been more
hesitant to invoke the doctrine beyond the common trust fund situation. If the
rule of the Mullane case is restricted to its narrowest view, a common trust
fund situation, its importance is small. If not so restricted, but instead given a
broad and general application, it means that the validity of existing notice
provisions should be the subject of serious consideration. It will be interesting
to note what disposition the Supreme Court will place on the instant case when
it hears the argument this term. 15
In the present case, the plaintiff's property on the Neversink River is near
Cuddebackville, near the City of Port Jervis, New York. Yet, these two cities
were bypassed for publication in small newspapers published in Chester and
Warwick, New York, the same having no circulation whatever in the taking
area. Twenty posters were also attached to trees in the area of the taking,
but they were placed there in January when the plaintiff was residing in New
Jersey. Even though the majority here decided that the riparian owners were
adequately notified, the truth is that the publications and postings did not
reach most of the owners. It is significant to note that only eighteen of the
ninety-six property owners of parcels in Neversink Riparian section 4 filed
their claims in sufficient time. 16 Apparently the damage to the riparian owners'
property was considerable, for those who did file claims within the allotted
time limit received awards ranging from $1,000 to $57,500. Were the effects of
the water diversion really patently visible to the riparian owners within the
three years as the Court of Appeals seemed to suggest? The plaintiff's property,
in this case, was located twenty-five miles downstream from the site of the
water diversion. A layman, having no understanding of the technical reasons
for the effects of the diversion, knowing that the stream fluctuated greatly in
its pre-diversion state, could not be expected to conclude that there had been
an artificial diversion for which he is entitled to be compensated. This should
have been considered by the Court along with the fact that most of those
riparian owners who did not file for claims were only summer residents of the
area. When there is any question as to whether constructive notice will be
sufficient, why not require personal notice? This would not place too great a
burden on any government in the administrative process. When the State of
New York constructed the Thruway, the State, under section thirty of the
Highway Law, was required to give personal notice to all the property owners
involved. The New York State Thruway involved more than four hundred
miles of highway. The diversion of the Neversink River involved a strip of
14. See, e.g., Behrman v. Egan, 9 N.J. Super. 171, 75 A.2d 627 (1950).
15. Appeal docketed, No. 763, 1961 Term, No. 75, 1962 Term, March 2, 1962.
16. For other dismissals see: Matter of Huie (Riehle), 6 A.D.2d 838, 176 N.Y.S.2d
197 (2d Dep't 1958); Matter of Huie (Nielson), 6 AMD.2d 837, 176 N.Y.S.2d 193 (2d
Dep't 1958); Matter of Huie (Bruckman), 28 Misc. 2d 708, 221 N.Y.S.2d 689 (Sup. Ct.
1956); Application of Huie (Rollin), 204 Misc. 945, 125 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup. Ct. 1953).

189

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
river only thirty-five miles in length. Mr. Justice Eager seemed to summarize
the view of the New York courts when he replied in an unreported decision
which denied a claimant's application that "It is true that the result is an
inequitable one, but the enforcement of a statute of limitations ofttimes results
M. A. K.
in inequity.""'
DOMAIN EXERCISED FOR
LAND FOR PRVATE REDEVELOPMENT
POWER OF EMINENT

THE

TAKING OF

NON-SLUM

One of the increasingly important problems facing our generation is that
of the physical deterioration of our cities and its expensive burden upon society.
Various measures and programs have been instituted at different levels of
government to alleviate this problem. One such attempt can be found in
section 1 of article XVIII of the Constitution of the State of New York,
wherein is provided legislative authority for slum clearance and the construction
of decent housing facilities for citizens of low income, and "for the clearance,
replanning, reconstruction and rehabilitation of substandard and insanitary
areas, or for both such purposes, and for recreational and other facilities incidental or appurtenant thereto." For some time the frontal attack on urban
deterioration has proceeded along broad, general lines calling for the destruction
of slums and their replacement with new housing. Today, however, it is becoming increasingly apparent that this is not enough; that there is need of a
complementary program of commercial, industrial, institutional, recreational,
and educational urban redevelopment, if existing patterns of deterioration
are to be checked and reversed. New York State embarked upon such a course
with the passage of a statute that gives cities the power of eminent domain for
reclaiming and redeveloping urban areas that are predominantly vacant and
economically dead, such that their continued existence impairs the sound
economic growth of the community, with the resultant development of slums
and blighted areas.
Cannata v. City of New York, 11 N.Y.2d 210, 182 N.E.2d 395, 227
N.Y.S.2d 903 (1962), was an action instituted in the Supreme Court, Special
Term, Kings County, for a judgment declaring this statute, section 72-n of the
General Municipal Law,1 unconstitutional on its face. The action was brought
by sixty-eight home owners in the Canarsie section of Brooklyn whose land
is to be condemned and acquired by the city through a procedure authorized
by the statute. The homes of the plaintiffs are, for the most part, located in one
section of the total area to be condemned, but they were considered by the
New York City Board of Estimate and the City Planning Commission to be
17.

Brief for Respondent, Schroeder v. City of New York, 10 N.Y.2d 522, 180 N.E.2d

568, 225 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1962).

1. N.Y. Gen. Munic. Law, § 72-n, Laws 1958, repealed and re-enacted in modified
form in Article 15.

